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Abstract—During the past decades, there is a great popular-
ity employing nonlinear dynamics and permutation-substitution
architecture for image encryption. There are three primary pro-
cedures in such encryption schemes, the key schedule module for
producing encryption factors, permutation for image scrambling
and substitution for pixel modification. Under the assumption of
chosen-ciphertext attack, we evaluate the security of a class of
image ciphers which adopts pixel-level permutation and modular
addition for substitution. It is mathematically revealed that the
mapping from differentials of ciphertexts to those of plaintexts
are linear and has nothing to do with the key schedules,
permutation techniques and encryption rounds. Moreover, a
universal chosen-ciphertext attack is proposed and validated.
Experimental results demonstrate that the plaintexts can be
directly reconstructed without any security key or encryption
elements. Related cryptographic discussions are also given.
Index Terms—Cryptanalysis, substitution and permutation,
modular addition, chosen-ciphertext attack
I. INTRODUCTION
Benefiting from the fascinating Internet applications such
as twitter, instagram etc., recent years have witnessed a
dramatic popularity of the multimedia exchanging over public
networks. Persons are accustomed to sharing images or videos
whenever and wherever possible, which has indeed become
an indispensable issue of our daily life. On the other hand,
this popularity has further led to an increasing requirements
of secure transmission and storage of multimedia data over
public communication infrastructures. Encryption is the easiest
way to cope with this issue. Obviously, conventional ciphers
like Triple-DES and AES can be straightforward employed
to encrypt multimedia data by considering it as standard bit
stream, this is the so-called ‘naive encryption’ [1]. On the
contrary, many researchers strive for the specialized encryption
schemes by taking advantage of the intrinsic features of
multimedia data [1], [2], such as significant pixel correlation
and large data volume. The encryption schemes analyzed in
this paper belong to the latter. Hereinafter, we focus on image
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Fig. 1. Permutation-substitution architecture for image encryption.
encryption schemes as video ciphers are usually built by
operating image ciphers on frame-by-frame fashion.
The permutation-substitution 1 is the most popular archi-
tecture for image ciphers. As plotted in Fig. 1, an iterative
permutation process is implemented for pixel shuffling (with
their values unchanged), and then a substitution procedure
is performed for modification of pixel values and avalanche
performance. The encryption kernel will repeat many rounds to
achieve a higher security level. Originating from the works of
Fridrich and Chen [3]–[5], chaos and other nonlinear dynamics
have been frequently employed to produce the encryption
elements required for permutation and substitution. This is
because the fundamental properties of chaotic systems such
as ergodicity and sensitivity to initial conditions are desirable
for the confusion and diffusion effects of an encryption scheme
[2]. From the past decades, the permutation-substitution struc-
ture has aroused a booming of image ciphers. Their primary
innovations can be identified into three categories, i.e., novel
permutation approaches [4]–[15], new substitution techniques
[4], [13], [16], [17] and more complex dynamic phenomena
[13], [16]–[26].
Generally, statistical or empirical tests are introduced for
security assessment of these permutation-substitution image
ciphers. The performance indicators include histogram, adja-
cent pixel correlation, information entropy [27], NPCR and
UACI [28], NIST randomness test, etc. In [29], it is found that
these empirical indicators are not powerful conditions for the
security declaration. Actually, a lot of permutation-substitution
image ciphers that passed these tests have been cracked
[30]–[34]. However, relative cryptanalysis achievements are
usually case-by-case. For example, the equivalent permutation
key of Fridrich’s cipher was retrievable by chosen-ciphertext
attack [30], [31], while Li cryptanalyzed an encryption scheme
employing the first-order time-delay system [34]. On the other
1It may be referred as permutation-diffusion in some literatures, yet the
so-called diffusion module is actually a substitution procedure for diffusion.
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hand, generalized cryptanalysis of permutation-only [35]–[37]
and substitution-only [38] ciphers was conducted without
considering the mutual security promotion of each other. Few
universal cryptanalysis for iterative permutation-substitution
image ciphers was reported.
This paper moves one step further, we present universal
cryptanalysis for a family of permutation-substitution image
ciphers. From the outside, they share the following similar
features.
1) Both permutation and substitution are included;
2) the encryption core, i.e., permutation-substitution net-
work, can be iteratively performed with round keys;
3) image permutation is performed in pixel-level, with in-
dependent shuffling matrix;
4) substitution is implemented with modular addition tech-
nique, i.e., Eqs. (1) to (3) or their variants.
c(i) = m(i)+˙k(i) (1)
c(i) = m(i)+˙k(i)+˙c(i− 1) (2)
c(i) = m(i)+˙k(i)+˙c(i− 1)+˙c(i− 2) (3)
Typical ciphers can be found in [12]–[14], [16], [22], [39]–
[42], which all fall into the scope of this work. Our achieve-
ment is different from [29] where Uhl placed more emphasis
on the insufficiency of involved statistical/empirical tests for
security declaration. We will theoretically illustrate and experi-
mentally verify that a family of permutation-substitution image
ciphers are breakable. This work can also be considered as the
inheritance and development of related works [33], [43], [44],
because our mathematical analysis and universal practicability
are better than both counterparts 2. Besides, the proposed
attack is feasible to recover the plaintext without retrieving
the permutation vectors and substitution masks in advance.
This is significantly different from the previous achievements.
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
1) We formalize the security of a family of permutation-
substitution image ciphers which adopts pixel-level per-
mutation and modular-addition substitution.
2) Cryptanalysis of these ciphers is mathematically con-
ducted, and the security flaw is generalized.
3) A chosen-ciphertext attack is proposed, and its universal-
ity is discussed.
4) We further reveal that the security level of involved ci-
phers cannot be improved by enhancing complex dynam-
ics, sophisticated permutation techniques or increasing
the encryption iterations.
5) The cryptanalysis and chosen-ciphertext attack are exper-
imentally validated.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II gives the employed notations and assumption, while related
works and the motivations are discussed in Section III. From
a basic model, Section IV draws the chosen-ciphertext attack,
whose universality is comprehensively analyzed in Section V.
Cryptographic applications and numerical results are given in
Section VI, finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
2Specifically, the work in [33] requires mathematically generalization, while
the cryptanalysis in [43] should be better extended to more encryption rounds.
II. NOTATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. Notations
Unless otherwise indicated, most of the notations adopted
in this paper are listed in Table I.
Table I. Summary of the adopted notations.
Notation Style Description
A bold uppercase an assemble, generally denotes a vector
a lowercase element of corresponding assemble in
bold uppercase
A capital a constant
X(i) superscript
bracket-within-
number
factors in ith encryption round
Xi subscript index of factors
(˙) algebraic oper-
ators with a dot
on the head
modulo algebra as described in the fol-
lowing equations, where G represents
gray-scale of the plaintext’s pixel.
a+˙b = (a+ b) mod G
a−˙b = (a− b) mod G
a×˙b = (a× b) mod G∑˙j
i=1
a(i) = a(1)+˙ . . . +˙a(j)
Examples or complementary descriptions are as follows:
• Otherwise indicated, M and C are reserved for the
plaintext and ciphertext in a cipher, P and D specifically
denote the intermediate ciphertexts in a permutation-
then-substitution or substitution-then-permutation cipher,
while W and K represent the permutation vector and
substitution matrix, respectively.
• The image is assumed having size H×W . Yet, this paper
prefers the vector representation of an image, i.e., M =
{m(1),m(2), . . . ,m(i), . . . ,m(L)}, L = H ×W .
• As to the superscript and subscript, for example, C(1)1
is the ciphertext of M1 in the first round of encryption,
whereas P(3)2 /D
(3)
2 denotes the intermediate permuta-
tion/substitution ciphertext of M2 in the 3rd iteration.
• As special cases, M(1) means the input plaintext, and the
output ciphertext is represented as C(N) where N refers
to the iteration counts of an encryption scheme.
• The modular subtraction of two images is defined as their
differential, denoted as ∆M = M1−˙M2.
B. Attack assumptions
In a secret communication system, the ciphertext is assumed
to be transmitted over public channels. Technically, everybody
is able to eavesdrop the ciphertext, yet it is unaccessible with-
out the key. In this scenario, cryptanalysis refers to the signal
retrieval without secret key. By the power of the adversary,
four kinds of attack models are concluded by Kerckhoffs.
1) Ciphertext-only attack: the adversary only has a number
of ciphertexts.
2) Known-plaintext attack: the adversary has a collection of
ciphertexts and their plaintexts.
3) Chosen-plaintext attack: the adversary can construct any
plaintexts he want and obtain their ciphertexts.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. **, NO. **, ** 2019 3
4) Chosen-ciphertext attack: the adversary can construct any
ciphertexts he want and get their plaintexts.
Chosen-ciphertext attack is employed in this paper. Specif-
ically, arbitrary numbers of ciphertexts and their decryption
results are obtainable, whereas we don’t own the secret key
and cannot directly decrypt the receiving ciphertext either. By
exploiting the knowledge resides in these chosen-ciphertexts
and corresponding plaintexts, the attack is said to be successful
if any of the receiving ciphertext can be successfully recovered
without the key. It should be emphasized that cryptanalysis
under other attack models is also important, but it is not the
focus of our work. We construct a universal chosen-ciphertext
attack that is valid to a class of image ciphers.
III. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATION
A. Overview of image ciphers
Since the standardization of permutation-substitution archi-
tecture [4], [5], a booming of image ciphers was aroused
[45]. To the best of our knowledge, their innovations can be
identified into the following three primary categories.
1) Novel permutation approaches. There are two kinds of
permutation techniques. The first type treats image pixels
as a whole, rather than splitting them into binary stream
in advance. Arnold cat map, baker map and standard
map are the most popular permutation techniques, they
have been employed in the foundation work of Fridrich
[3]. To perform pixel-level permutation efficiently, Chen
extended the cat map and baker map to three-dimensional
[4], [5], while a general gray code has also been exploited
for image shuffling owing to its efficient hardware and
software implementation [6], [7]. Instead of pixel-by-
pixel shuffling, row and column circular permutation
[46] as well as block shuffling have been developed [8].
Other mathematical transforms were also introduced for
permutation, for example, quaternion rotation [9], Hilbert
curve [10] and many others [11], [12], [15]. On the other
hand, bit-level permutation is implemented by splitting
the plain image into a binary matrix. In this scenario,
bit relocation and pixel value modification effects are
simultaneously obtained [47].
2) New substitution techniques. Unlike traditional S-box
mapping, algebraic operations are always employed for
pixel substitution. Typical substitution equations are listed
in Eqs. (1)–(3) and (4)–(5), where +˙ and ⊕ represents
modular addition and bitwise exclusive-OR (XOR), m(i),
k(i), c(i) and c(i− 1) denotes current plain pixel, secret
mask, cipher pixel and the previous cipher pixel, respec-
tively [3]. The pixel c(i− 1) is introduced for spreading
one pixel change in the plaintext to a large region in the
ciphertext, i.e., the so-called avalanche effect.
c(i) = m(i)⊕ k(i)⊕ c(i− 1) (4)
c(i) = (m(i)+˙k(i))⊕ k(i)⊕ c(i− 1) (5)
Besides the masking formulas, various substitution pat-
terns are also attractive, such as bilateral-substitution
[48], simultaneous permutation-substitution [49], [50]
and pixel-related avalanche mechanism [51], [52].
3) Introducing complex dynamic phenomena. Permutation
vector and substitution masks are secret essentials in these
ciphers. They are generally produced in a secret and
random way, with the employed complex dynamics. In
the early age, classical chaotic systems such as logistic
map and cat map were frequently adopted. Yet, they were
assumed insecure in recent years. As replacements, hyper-
chaotic maps [18] and various improved chaotic principle
[13], [16], [19]–[22] have been introduced for generating
the required encryption elements. Besides, other complex
dynamics originates from physical phenomena also show
great potentials. For example, quantum walks was evac-
uated in [17], [23], whereas Wang introduced Brownian
motion [24] and wave perturbations [25] to produce key
stream elements.
B. Security analysis
Security is the most critical issue for a cipher. In litera-
ture, statistical matrices including histogram, correlation of
neighbor pixels, information entropy are usually employed for
security evaluation of permutation-substitution image ciphers.
It is very different from the comprehensive mathematical
underpinning for traditional ciphers’ (such as DES and RSA)
security assessment. The advances of chaotic cryptography
reveal that such empirical tests cannot declare security of a
cipher [29], it is easy to construct an apparent insecure en-
cryption scheme and make it pass these tests. The motivations
and security assessment matrices of image ciphers have been
depreciated theoretically and experimentally [29].
In literature, amounts of the ‘passed’ image ciphers have
been cracked. According to Web of Science, there are ap-
proximately 170 publications focus on security analysis of
image ciphers 3. Throughout these publications, the following
limitations can be identified.
1) Most of them are case-by-case. In other says, majority of
the published attacks are only valid for a specified image
cipher, whereas not feasible for counterparts. Fridrich’s
cipher is cryptanalyzed in [30], [31], which demonstrated
a chosen-ciphertext attack for retrieving the permutation
matrices. The cipher employing a first-order time-delay
system was recently broken by Li [34] through chosen-
plaintext attack, and Wang cryptanalyzed two bit-level
encryption schemes developed in [32], [33]. Few univer-
sal cryptanalysis works were reported.
2) Cryptanalysis of permutation-only and substitution-only
image ciphers. In [35]–[37], a permutation cipher has
been generalized to an invertible key-dependent vector
W = [w(i) ∈ L],L = {1, 2, . . . , L}, whose particle w(i)
refers to the secret coordination of a plain pixel that will
be re-located to ith position in the ciphertext 4. Obviously,
W is an L → L bijection. The function W is further
3Search ‘(attack OR cryptanalysis OR breaking OR cracking OR (security
analysis) OR cryptanalyzing OR comment) AND image AND (cipher OR
cryptosystem OR encryption)’ in the title domain of Web of Science.
4For simplifying the following analysis, w(i) here is essentially defined as
the inverse of that in [35]–[37].
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defined to generalize the permutation encryption, as given
in Eqs. (6) and (7).
p(i) = m(w(i)) (6)
P =W(M) (7)
Known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks have been
proved feasible to recover the permutation vector [35]–
[37]. Besides, Zhang cryptanalyzed image ciphers which
totally use substitution methods [38]. However, most
of the image ciphers include both of the permuta-
tion and substitution procedures. The cryptanalysis of
permutation-only and substitution-only ciphers were il-
luminative [35]–[38], yet not feasible for the ciphers
combining permutation and substitution together.
3) Cryptanalysis of a popular substitution mechanism within
a single round. As aforementioned, Eqs. (1)–(5) are the
most popular pixel substitution mechanisms which have
been frequently employed in permutation-substitution
image ciphers. In [43], Zhang analyzed the crypto-
graphic strength of Eq. (5) under the assumption of
known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks. Subse-
quently, three image ciphers were cryptanalyzed. How-
ever, his cryptanalysis assumed that the encryption was
implemented only a single round, and will become invalid
for the iterative structure. Except for Zhang’s attack
[43], most of the cryptanalysis in literature was also
achieved by assuming the encryption as one round. On the
contrary, ciphers are generally proposed to be iteratively
implemented with round keys, like AES.
C. Motivation and innovation
Complying with the limitations of the cryptanalysis in
literature, we come to the keywords of our work, including
‘generalized cryptanalysis’, ‘permutation-substitution’ and ‘it-
eratively performed’. They are the primary motivations and
innovations of this work. In comparison with peer works, the
proposed cryptanalysis owns the following features.
1) The cryptanalysis is valid for a class of image ciphers,
rather than a specified one.
2) Both permutation and substitution procedures are in-
cluded in the attacked encryption schemes.
3) The encryption core can be iteratively implemented with
round keys.
Specifically, we focus on the security of a class of image
ciphers using pixel-level permutation and modular addition
substitution (Eqs. (1) to (3)), such as the ones in [12]–[14],
[16], [22], [39]–[42]. We found that they suffer from identical
vulnerabilities, nothing to do with the permutation technique,
employed nonlinear dynamics, key scheduling process and the
encryption rounds. A chosen-ciphertext attack is valid to crack
all of them without any modification. Details and discussions
will be given in Sections IV – VI.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION FROM A BASIC MODEL
We start with the cryptanalysis of a basic cipher, which is
constructed according to the focused permutation-substitution
structure depicted in Fig. 1. Then we come to its vulnerability
against differential cryptanalysis, based on which a chosen-
ciphertext attack is step-by-step illustrated.
A. A basic model
In this cipher, the plaintext M is firstly scrambled using a
certain permutation technique, then the permutation ciphertext
is modified according to Eq. (1). The core permutation and
substitution operations are iteratively implemented for several
rounds to produce the final ciphertext.
Following the nomenclature in Section II-A, the interme-
diate permutation ciphertext is obtained as P = W(M).
Referring to Eq. (1), the ciphertext is calculated according
to C = P+˙K, where K is the substitution masks generated
by the employed nonlinear dynamics. To be concluded, the
ciphertext in a certain encryption iteration is
C =W(M)+˙K. (8)
Considering that the encryption process is iteratively imple-
mented, the ciphertext in the ith encryption round can be
therefore obtained as
C(i) =W(i)(C(i−1))+˙K(i), (9)
where C(0) = M(1) denotes the input plain image accordingly.
B. Differential analysis
Suppose that there are two plaintexts M1, M2 and their
ciphertexts C1, C2 in a certain encryption round. Referring
to Eq. (8), the differential of the ciphertexts is therefore
calculated as
∆C = C1−˙C2
= (W(M1)+˙K)−˙(W(M2)+˙K)
=W(M1)−˙W(M2)
.
As permutation changes only pixel locations with their values
un-modified, and pixels in the same position will be trans-
ferred to an identical coordinate in the ciphertexts, therefore
W(M1)−˙W(M2) =W(M1−˙M2) =W(∆M) , so that
∆C =W(∆M). (10)
Definition 1. The differential transfer function (DTF) H(∆M)
is defined as the mapping from ∆M to ∆C in a certain
encryption round, i.e.,
∆C = H(∆M).
Referring to Eq. (10), DTF of the basic cipher is
∆C = H(basic)(∆M) =W(∆M). (11)
Property 1. H(basic)(∆M) has bijectivity, namely ∆M1 =
∆M2 if and only if H(basic)(∆M1) = H(basic)(∆M2).
Proof. As well-known, the permutation operationW is a one-
to-one mapping and thus H(basic)(∆M) = W(∆M) is a
bijection. Hence complete the proof.
Property 2. H(basic)(∆M) has modular additivity, that is
H(basic)(∆M1)+˙H(basic)(∆M2) = H(basic)(∆M1+˙∆M2).
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Proof. Considering that the permutation just contributes pixel
re-location, and plain pixels in the same coordinate will be
shuffled to an identical position in the ciphertexts, thus
H(basic)(∆M1)+˙H(basic)(∆M2) =W(∆M1)+˙W(∆M2)
=W(∆M1+˙∆M2)
= H(basic)(∆M1+˙∆M2)
.
Proof over.
Property 3. H(basic)(∆M) has modular multiplicability, that
is
λ×˙H(basic)(∆M) = H(basic)(λ×˙∆M).
Proof. Similarly, as only pixel relocation is performed in the
permutation phase,
λ×˙H(basic)(∆M) =λ×˙W(∆M)
=W(λ×˙∆M)
=H(basic)(λ×˙∆M)
.
Proof over.
Specifically, H(i)(basic)(∆M) denotes the DTF in the ith en-
cryption round. As indicated from Eq. (9), if different permuta-
tion vectors W are used, the transfer functions H(i)(basic)(∆M)
are consequently different from each other. However, all of
them have bijectivity, modular additivity and multiplicative
properties. In conclusion, the transfer functions H(i)(basic)(∆M)
are key-dependent, however, their bijectivity, modular additiv-
ity and multiplicability properties are key-independent.
Definition 2. The cascaded differential transfer function
(CDTF) H(1)−(N)(∆M(1)) is defined as the mapping from the
differential of input plaintexts, i.e., ∆M(1), to that of output
ciphertexts in the N th encryption round, i.e., ∆C(N), that is
∆C(N) = H(1)−(N)(cipher) (∆M(1)). (12)
Property 4. H(1)−(N)(basic) (∆M(1)) also has bijectivity, modular
additivity and multiplicability properties.
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Remark 1. As to the basic cipher, the differential of the output
ciphertexts is ∆C(N), it is correlated with the differential of
original plaintexts ∆M(1) as
∆C(N) = H(1)−(N)(basic) (∆M(1))
which is a bijective, modular additive and multiplicable func-
tion.
C. The proposed chosen-ciphertext attack
As revealed in Remark 1, the CDTF of the basic cipher
has bijectivity, modular additivity and multiplicability proper-
ties. Benefiting from this, a chosen-ciphertext attack can be
launched to retrieve the plaintext. The attack consists of five
steps whose code implementation can refer to Algorithm 1,
and described in detail as follows.
Algorithm 1 The proposed chosen-ciphertext attack.
Input: A ciphertext C
Output: The plaintext M
1: L = Length(C);
2: C0 = zeros(1, L);
3: M0 = decrypt(C0);
4: for each i ∈ [1, L] do
5: Ci = zeros(1, L);
6: ci(i) = 1;
7: Mi = decrypt(Ci);
8: ∆Mi = Mi−˙M0;
9: end for
10: ∆M = zeros(1, L);
11: for each i ∈ [1, L] do
12: ∆M = ∆M+˙c(i)×˙∆Mi;
13: end for
14: M = ∆M+˙M0;
15: return M;
1) Construct L + 1 chosen-ciphertexts, where L represents
the number of pixels in the ciphertext. They are denoted
as C0,C1, · · · ,Ci, · · · ,CL. The ciphertext C0 is a zero
image, whereas Ci, i ∈ [1, L] is constructed by
ci(j) =
{
1, j = i
0, j 6= i, j ∈ [1, L] .
2) Obtain their corresponding plaintexts, represented as
M0,M1, · · · ,Mi, · · · ,ML, respectively.
3) Calculate the differentials of the plaintexts, i.e., obtain
∆Mi = Mi−˙M0, i ∈ [1, L]. The plaintext M0, together
with these differentials ∆M1, · · ·∆ML jointly serve as
atoms of the following signal recovery process.
4) For any eavesdropped ciphertext C = {c(i), i ∈ [1, L]},
assumed its plaintext as M whose differential between
M0 is denoted as ∆M. We can obtain ∆M according to
∆M =
∑˙L
i=1
[c(i)×˙∆Mi].
• It is obviously that C =
∑˙L
i=1[c(i)×˙Ci].
• As C0 is a zero image, hence ∆Ci = Ci−˙C0 = Ci.
• Further, we can get ∆C =
∑˙L
i=1[c(i)×˙∆Ci].
• Referring to the bijectivity, modular additivity and
multiplicability of the cipher’s CDTF, thus, we can
get ∆M =
∑˙L
i=1[c(i)×˙∆Mi].
5) Finally, the plaintext M is recovered according to
M = ∆M+˙M0.
D. Example illustration
For better understanding, the attack procedures are depicted
as Fig. 2 assuming that the encryption block contains 9 pixels.
Each step of the PCCA is sequentially tagged within a dotted
box in Fig. 2.
Firstly, 9 + 1 = 10 chosen-ciphertexts are elaborately
constructed in the first step, then obtain their corresponding
plaintexts in Step 2. Unlike the distinctive chosen-ciphertexts,
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× 
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× 
• 
ciphertext waiting for attack
…… 
ciphertext in attacking
Fig. 2. An example illustration of the proposed chosen-ciphertext attack.
the plaintexts are unpredictable, as revealed by their gray
levels. In the 3rd dotted box, the plaintexts are individually
modular subtracted with M0. So that, ∆M1, · · ·∆M9 are
produced. Together with M0, they jointly act as atoms of the
following signal recovery process.
For a receiving ciphertext C = {c(1), · · · , c(9)}, modular
multiplications are performed between the cipher pixels and
corresponding atoms, i.e., c(i)×˙∆Mi. Their products are then
modular added together to get ∆M, retrieved as the differential
between the plaintext and M0. This is Step 4 and illustrated
in the 4th dotted box. Finally, a modular addition is required
to get the recovered plaintext.
It should be emphasized that once the atoms are produced,
any of the receiving ciphertext can be straightforward attacked
without repeating the above three processes. In other words,
there may be a waiting list of ciphertexts which are one-by-one
recovered according to Steps 4) and 5).
V. UNIVERSALITY ANALYSIS
Hereinafter, we abbreviate the bijectivity, modular additivity
and multiplicability as BAM properties, while PCCA is used
to denote the proposed chosen-ciphertext attack achieved in
Section IV-C.
A. Complexity
Referring to Steps 1) – 3), PCCA needs L + 1 chosen-
ciphertexts to construct the atoms, i.e., M0 and ∆Mi. Once
the atoms being established, any of the receiving ciphertext
can be straightforward cracked. In each recovery process, L
modular addition and multiplication operations are required to
calculate ∆M, while another modular addition is sufficient for
recovering the plaintext.
To be concluded, the spatial and computational complexity
of PCCA are both O(L). It should be emphasized that the
cost is independent from the encryption rounds N . This
is counter-intuitive in comparison with current cryptanalysis
achievements whose complexity dramatically increase with the
encryption rounds, such as [31].
B. Universality
As indicated from Section IV-C, the CDTF’s BAM prop-
erties essentially render the feasibility of PCCA. It is further
revealed from Property 4 that if a cipher’s DTF has BAM
features, so is the CDTF. In conclusion, if a cipher’s DTF or
CDTF has BAM properties, it is vulnerable against PCCA.
We find that a family of image ciphers suffer from the
aforementioned vulnerabilities, PCCA is hence feasible to
crack them directly. Their intrinsic DTFs or CDTFs have
the BAM properties, while they usually share the following
fashions from the outside.
1) The permutation-substitution architecture is adopted, as
depicted in Fig. 1.
2) Permutation is performed in pixel-level, whereas modular
addition family equations, i.e., (1) to (3) or their variants,
are employed for substitution.
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3) The permutation vector and substitution mask are key-
dependent.
4) The encryption core can be iteratively implemented with
round keys.
In literature, there are many ciphers of this kind, such as
the ones in [12]–[14], [16], [22], [39]–[42] which all fall
into the scope of this work. Besides, the proposed attack is
also feasible for permutation-only and substitution-only image
ciphers accordingly 5.
C. Indications
Originating from the intrinsic BAM drawbacks of cor-
responding image ciphers, it is demonstrated that one can
recover the plaintext by PCCA, without the permutation vector
W, substitution mask K or the launched secret key. Further-
more, the involved ciphers will also be vulnerable to PCCA
no matter how many rounds the encryption are iterated, and
no matter the launched keys in each round are different or not.
This work also indicates that the enhancements in terms of
nonlinear dynamics, permutation techniques and substitution
masks are useless for the security promotion. Generally speak-
ing, the only role of the employed nonlinear dynamics (such
as the chaotic systems) is to produce the permutation vector
W and substitution mask K. However, they have been revealed
unnecessary in the attack.
In [14], [42], a series of random pixels are added around
the plaintext before the permutation-substitution network. The
insertion of random pixels gives indistinguishability of this
cipher, i.e., different ciphertexts will be produced at distinct
time even with identical plaintexts and secret key. In this
scenario, known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks become
infeasible accordingly. This is because one cannot control
the produced random pixels, hence the actual input of the
permutation-substitution iteration is unknown either. However,
such a design is also infeasible to resist against PCCA. The
cipher proposed in [14] will be taken as case study and
cryptanalyzed in Section VI-B. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first time to crack an image encryption scheme with
noise embedding.
VI. CRYPTOGRAPHIC APPLICATIONS
As aforementioned, PCCA is feasible to crack a class of
image ciphers. Table II lists the brief security analysis of
these encryption schemes [12]–[14], [16], [22], [39]–[42]. All
of them adopt pixel-level permutation and employ modular
addition for substitution, as indicated in Section V-B. Most
of the improvements lie in novel chaotic maps and new
permutation techniques, however, they have been indicated
unnecessary for the attack.
In the following, two ciphers [13], [14] are taken as case
studies in individual subsections, while other counterparts will
be sketched in Section VI-C. As the key schedule procedures
and permutation techniques have been revealed nothing to do
with the resistance against PCCA, they are browsed in the
following for simplicity.
5It is different from the specified cryptanalysis given in [35]–[38], yet it
does work.
A. Applicability to Zhou’s cipher [13]
Zhou’s ciphr proposed in [13] that used Eq. (3) for substi-
tution is firstly taken as case study. The encryption processes
are given as follows.
1) Initialization. With the key Seed and cascade chaotic
systems to generate a permutation vector W and a sub-
stitution mask matrix K.
2) Substitution. Two previous cipher pixels are linked for
avalanche effect, that is
d(i) =

m(i)+˙k(i)+˙m(L)+˙m(L− 1) i = 1
m(i)+˙k(i)+˙d(i− 1)+˙m(L) i = 2
m(i)+˙k(i)+˙d(i− 1)+˙d(i− 2) i ∈ [3, L]
.
(13)
3) Permutation. Shuffle the substitution ciphertext D with
W and a cycle permutation technique. Similarly, the
permutation is finalized as Eq. (14).
C =W(D) (14)
4) Iteration. The above procedures are repeated 2 times with
different W and K in each round.
Assume that there are two plaintexts M1 and M2, their
intermediate substitution results D1 and D2, and the ciphertexts
C1 and C2 in a certain encryption round. It is obvious that
∆C = C1−˙C2 =W(D1)−˙W(D2) =W(D1−˙D2) =W(∆D).
(15)
It is not difficult to rewrite the substitution (Eq. (13)) as
d(i) =
∑˙i
j=1
Fib(i− j + 1)×˙[m(j)+˙k(j)]
+˙Fib(i+ 1)×˙m(L)+˙Fib(i)×˙m(L− 1)
where Fib(i) means the ith particle of a Fibonacci sequence.
Therefore, we can get
∆d(i) =
∑˙i
j=1
Fib(i− j + 1)×˙∆m(j)
+˙Fib(i+ 1)×˙∆m(L)+˙Fib(i)×˙∆m(L− 1)
. (16)
Combining Eqs. (15) and (16), the DTF of Zhou’s cipher can
be illustrated as
∆C = H(Zhou)(∆M) =W(∆D)
∆d(i) =
∑˙i
j=1
Fib(i− j + 1)×˙∆m(j)
+˙Fib(i+ 1)×˙∆m(L)+˙Fib(i)×˙∆m(L− 1)
.
(17)
It is not difficult to conclude the BAM properties of
H(Zhou)(∆M).
1) Bijectivity. Referring to Eq. (17), it is obvious that the
mapping from ∆M to ∆D is revisable, while W also
gives a bijection from ∆D to ∆C in Eq. (15). There-
fore, the mapping between ∆C and ∆M, i.e., ∆C =
H(Zhou)(∆M), is bijective.
2) Modular additivity and multiplicability. As can be ob-
served, H(Zhou)(∆M) is a combination of permutation,
modular addition and multiplication operations. All of
them are apparently modular additive and multiplicable,
as a consequence, H(Zhou)(∆M) has modular additivity
and multiplicability.
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Table II. Applicability of the proposed chosen-ciphertext attack.
Image ciphers Encryption process Security enhancement Applicable
[12]
1) substitution with k(i)−˙m(i)
2) key-dependent permutation
3) four iterations
1) a new integrated chaotic map
2) a permutation approach
yes
[13]
1) substitution using Eq. (3)
2) key-dependent permutation
3) two iterations
1) a new cascade chaotic map
2) a permutation approach
yes
[14]
1) insert random pixels around the plaintext’s four edges
2) key-dependent permutation
3) substitution using Eq. (2)
4) two iterations
1) inserting random pixels before permutation-
substitution network
2) a fast permutation method
yes
[39]
1) key-dependent permutation
2) substitution using Eq. (1)
a new permutation method yes
[40]
1) key-dependent permutation
2) substitution using Eq. (3)
3) four iterations
1) a new coupling chaotic map
2) a new permutation method
yes
[16]
1) key-dependent permutation
2) row-by-row and then column-by-column substitution
using Eq. (2)
3) two iterations
1) a new coupling chaotic map
2) a new permutation method
3) two stages of substitution
yes
[22]
1) key-dependent permutation
2) rotation
3) substitution in random order using Eq. (2)
4) four iterations
1) a new coupling chaotic map
2) a new permutation method
3) the substitution is in random order
yes
[41]
1) key-dependent permutation
2) substitution using image filtering, i.e., linking many
neighbor pixels
3) two iterations
1) a new permutation method
2) substitution using image filtering
yes
[42]
1) insert random pixels around two edges
2) key-dependent permutation
3) substitution using image filtering
3) four iterations
1) inserting random pixels before permutation-
substitution network
2) substitution using image filtering
yes
To be concluded, the DTF of Zhou’s cipher [13] has BAM
properties and thus vulnerable against PCCA.
B. Applicability to Hua’s cipher [14]
In [14], an image cipher using Eq. (2) for substitution is
proposed. Unlike most of the counterparts, random pixels
are firstly generated and pasted around the plaintext, and
then the enlarged image is encrypted by the permutation-
substitution network 6. The insertion of random pixels gives
indistinguishability of the cipher, so as to resist against known-
plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks. After cryptanalyzing
Zhou’s cipher that used Eq. (3) for substitution, it is reasonable
to infer that similar encryption scheme adopting substitution
with Eq. (2) is also vulnerable against PCCA. To some extent,
Hua’s cipher [14] is introduced with specific motivation to
show that such a random inserting process is infeasible to resist
against PCCA. The encryption processes in [14] are sketched
as follows.
1) Initialization. With the key Seed and logistic-sine map,
generate a permutation vector W and a substitution mask
matrix K.
2) Random pixel insertion. Generate 2 ×M + 2 × N + 4
random pixels, and then paste them around the four sides
of the input plaintext M. Hence, an enlarged image MI
with size (H + 2)× (W + 2) is obtained.
6Two ciphers are proposed in [14], this paper focus MIE-MA which uses
modular addition for pixel substitution.
3) Permutation. Shuffle the enlarged image MI using W and
a certain row/column swapping approach. Analogously,
the permutation procedure is generalized as
P =W(MI).
4) Substitution. Stretch P column-by-column, and then per-
form pixel substitution according to Eq. (18). As indi-
cated, a previous cipher pixel is linked.
c(i) =
{
p(i)+˙k(i)+˙p(L) i = 1
p(i)+˙k(i)+˙c(i− 1) i ∈ [2, L]. (18)
5) Iteration. The permutation-substitution network are iter-
ated 2 times with independent W and K.
By adding random edge pixels, Hua’s encryption scheme
firstly enlarges the H ×W input plaintext M into an interme-
diate image MI with size (H+2)×(W+2). It is subsequently
encrypted using two permutation-substitution iterations, hence,
the ciphertext is also with size (H + 2) × (W + 2). On the
contrary, the input of Hua’s decryption is a (H+2)×(W +2)
ciphertext which will be decoded to an H×W image. Without
loss of generality, we denote the random inserted variables as
R, and use symbol || to demonstrate the linking operation of
two matrices. That means
MI = M||R. (19)
In other words, MI is the input of the permutation-substitution
network in the encryption, and it also denotes the decryption
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result before removing the edge pixels. It should be empha-
sized that R is random and unobtainable in the encryption
process, however, it is definite in the decryption though it is
also unknown. So is MI.
As the sizes of M and C are not the same, it is difficult to
obtain H(Hua)(∆M) directly. As a replacement, we build the
relationship between the differential of MI with that of the ci-
phertext C. It is distinctively denoted as ∆C = H′(Hua)(∆MI),
without loss of generality. Firstly, we can easily rewrite Hua’s
substitution formula (Eq. (18)) as
c(i) = p(L)+˙
∑˙i
j=1
[p(j)+˙k(j)], (20)
where P = W(MI), i.e., the permutation ciphertext of the
enlarged image. Referring to the deduction of H(basic)(∆M)
in Section IV-B and taking Eqs. (6) and (20) into consideration,
we can get H′(Hua)(∆MI) as
∆C = H′(Hua)(∆MI)
∆c(i) = ∆mi(w(L))+˙
∑˙i
j=1
[∆mi(w(j))+˙k(j)]
, (21)
where w(j) is the element of the permutation vector W.
Similar to H(Zhou)(∆M), H′(Hua)(∆MI) also consists of a
series of permutation, modular addition and multiplication
operations, therefore it has BAM properties.
Benefiting from the BAM properties of H′(Hua)(∆MI),
PCCA is found feasible for cracking Hua’s cipher. As a
specified case, LL = (H + 2) × (W + 2) is defined in this
subsection. It refers to the pixel counts of the ciphertexts.
Complying with the PCCA’s steps described in Section IV-C,
the input plaintext is recovered as follows.
1) Referring to the first step of the attack, LL + 1 chosen-
ciphertexts, i.e., C0, · · · ,CLL, are firstly constructed, all
of them are with size (H + 2)× (W + 2).
2) Subsequently, LL+ 1 decryption results, M0, · · · ,MLL,
are also obtainable. Yet, their sizes are all H ×W .
• As intermediate products, MI0, · · · ,MILL and
R0, · · · ,RLL exist during the decryption process.
They are unknown, but not random.
• According to Eq. (19), MIi = Mi||Ri.
3) Further, we can calculate the differentials of the plaintexts
according to ∆Mi = Mi−˙M0, i ∈ [1, LL].
• Referring to Eq. (19), we can get ∆MIi =
MIi−˙MI0 = (Mi||Ri)−˙(M0||R0).
• As || is matrices-linking operation and considering
that pixels in different positions cannot affect each
other in the modular subtraction of two matrices,
thus (Mi||Ri)−˙(M0||R0)=(Mi−˙M0)||(Ri−˙R0) =
∆Mi||∆Ri.
• To be concluded, ∆MIi = ∆Mi||∆Ri.
• Similarly, ∆MIi and ∆Ri are unknown but not
random, they are introduced for theoretical analysis.
4) For any ciphertext C = {c(i), i ∈ [1, LL]}, assumed its
plaintext as M whose differential between M0 is denoted
as ∆M, we can get ∆M according to Eq. (22).
∆M =
∑˙LL
i=1
[c(i)×˙∆Mi]. (22)
• As C0 is a zero image, we can therefore get ∆Ci =
Ci−˙C0 = Ci.
• Note that ∆Ci and ∆Mi have different sizes.
• Considering thatH′(Hua)(∆MI) has BAM properties,
thus, ∆MI =
∑˙LL
i=1[c(i)×˙∆MIi].
• Once again, because || denotes matrices-liking oper-
ation and pixels in different positions cannot affect
each other in modular addition/multiplication of two
matrices, thus c(i)×˙∆MIi = c(i)×˙(∆Mi||∆Ri) =
(c(i)×˙∆Mi)||(c(i)×˙∆Ri).
• Furthermore,
∑˙LL
i=1[(c(i)×˙∆Mi)||(c(i)×˙∆Ri)] =∑˙LL
i=1[(c(i)×˙∆Mi)]||
∑˙LL
i=1[(c(i)×˙∆Ri)].
• Therefore, ∆MI can be finalized as ∆MI =∑˙LL
i=1[(c(i)×˙∆Mi)]||
∑˙LL
i=1[(c(i)×˙∆Ri)].
• Besides, it is known that ∆MI = ∆M||∆R.
• Till now, we can come to Eq. (22).
5) Therefore, the plaintext is recovered as M = ∆M+˙M0.
C. Applicability to other ciphers [12], [16], [22], [39]–[42]
Except for the aforementioned case studies, image en-
cryption schemes in [12], [16], [22], [39]–[42] share similar
architecture, and also suffer from the reported cryptanalysis.
1) Applicability to the cipher in [12]. Two integrated chaotic
systems are investigated for key schedule, and a new
permutation approach is developed. The permutation vec-
tor and substitution masks are fully depending on the
secret key. A slight difference is that the substitution is
performed using modular subtraction, specifically, c(i) =
k(i)−˙m(i). Referring to the cryptanalysis of the basic
cipher given in Section IV-B, it is easy to get the BAM
properties of this cipher’s DTF. Thus, PCCA is feasible.
2) Applicability to the cipher in [39]. Image permutation is
performed in pixel-level, and the substitution is conducted
with Eq. (1). In this cipher, logistic map, Tompkins-Paige
algorithm and Tent map are employed for generating
the permutation vector and substitution masks. These
encryption elements are independent from the plaintexts.
The cryptanalysis of the basic cipher described in Section
IV-B is straightforward valid for this cipher.
3) Applicability to the cipher in [40]. This encryption
scheme consists of four permutation-substitution itera-
tions. The permutation is performed in pixel-level, while
two previous ciphertexts are linked into the substitution
as given in Eq. (3). Referring to the cryptanalysis of
Zhou’s encryption scheme described in Section VI-A,
this cipher is vulnerable to PCCA accordingly. The
adopted novel permutation technique, complex logistic-
sine-coupling map and more encryption rounds cannot
promote the resistance against PCCA.
4) Applicability to the cipher in [16]. This cipher employs
sine-logistic modulation map for key schedule, and in-
troduces Eq. (2) for pixel substitution. A permutation,
row-by-row and column-by-column substitutions jointly
constitute the encryption core, which is iterated two
times. Essentially, the encryption loop can be regarded as
a two-layers permutation-substitution, where the second
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permutation is a 90◦ clock rotation. It is easy to conclude
that the DTF of this cipher is similar to Eq. (21) by
replacing ∆MI as ∆M 7, also, it has BAM properties.
As a consequence, PCCA is applicable.
5) Applicability to the cipher in [22]. Cosine-transform-
based chaotic system is developed for key schedule, while
Eq. (2) is used for substitution. The encryption core,
composed of a permutation, rotation and substitution,
is repeated four times. There are two features in this
cipher. On one hand, there is an image rotation module
between the permutation and substitution procedures.
Secondly, the substitution is performed secretly rather
than the traditional sequential implementation. By con-
sidering the secret-order substitution as a permutation-
then-substitution (sequential) procedure, the encryption
core turns to three permutation and one substitution pro-
cedures. Obviously, we can use one permutation vector to
synthesize the three permutation modules, and finalize the
iteration as a permutation-substitution network. Similar to
that of [16], PCCA is applicable too.
6) Applicability to the ciphers in [41], [42]. Both ciphers
outfit the iterative permutation-substitution structure, yet
the substitution is derived from the image filtering con-
cept. Technically, many neighbor pixels are linked for
substitution. Referring to the cryptanalysis when linking
one or two adjacent pixels for substitution, as given in
Sections VI-A and VI-B, it is reasonable to infer that the
DTFs of both ciphers [41], [42] are composed of a se-
ries of permutation, modular addition and multiplication
operations. They are similar to Eqs. (17) and (21), yet
may own different but definite coefficients. Accordingly,
they also have BAM properties. As a consequence, the
ciphers in [41], [42] own identical security drawback of
peer schemes and are vulnerable against PCCA.
D. Numerical experiments
This subsection gives numerical experimental results and
relative discussions. The experiments are implemented in Mat-
lab 2014a platform, and the source codes are open accessible
at https://github.com/lurenjia212/Break modadd.
Zhou’s cipher [13] is firstly introduced for a step-by-step
illustration. Without loss of generality, the image size is set
as 9 whose particles are 8-bit gray pixels, and the default key
embedded in Zhou’s source code is adopted 8. Using this key,
Alice encrypts an image
M = {0, 15, 33, 47, 65, 165, 56, 96, 255},
and get the ciphertext
C = {29, 67, 144, 143, 74, 127, 101, 24, 139},
which is eavesdropped by Eve. Subsequently, Eve tries to
recover the plaintext without the secret key. Completely com-
7As aforementioned, cryptanalysis of Hua’s cipher [14] in Section VI-B
is given with the specific purpose to illustrate that inserting random pixels
during the encryption process cannot promote the security against PCCA.
8A default key is embedded in Zhou’s source code, which is open accessible
via https://www.fst.um.edu.mo/en/staff/documents/fstycz/Hua2015TC.rar.
plying with the attack procedures in Section IV-C, the signal
recovery processes are illustrated as follows.
1) Construct 9 +1 = 10 chosen-ciphertxts, they are denoted
as C0,C1, · · · ,C9, respectively.
C0 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
C1 = {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
C2 = {0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
C3 = {0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
C4 = {0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
C5 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0}
C6 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}
C7 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}
C8 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0}
C9 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1}
2) Under the assumption of chosen-ciphertext attack, their
corresponding plaintexts are obtained as
M0 = {85, 16, 228, 187, 2, 230, 109, 110, 193}
M1 = {86, 14, 227, 189, 3, 230, 109, 110, 193}
M2 = {85, 17, 226, 186, 4, 231, 109, 110, 193}
M3 = {85, 16, 229, 185, 1, 232, 110, 110, 193}
M4 = {84, 16, 228, 188, 0, 229, 111, 111, 193}
M5 = {82, 15, 228, 187, 3, 228, 108, 112, 194}
M6 = {85, 13, 227, 187, 2, 231, 107, 109, 195}
M7 = {90, 16, 225, 186, 2, 230, 110, 108, 192}
M8 = {86, 19, 227, 186, 2, 230, 109, 111, 191}
M9 = {83, 15, 230, 188, 2, 230, 109, 110, 194}
.
3) The differentials of the plaintexts are
∆M1 = M1−˙M0 = {1, 254, 255, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0}
∆M2 = M2−˙M0 = {0, 1, 254, 255, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0}
∆M3 = M3−˙M0 = {0, 0, 1, 254, 255, 2, 1, 0, 0}
∆M4 = M4−˙M0 = {255, 0, 0, 1, 254, 255, 2, 1, 0}
∆M5 = M5−˙M0 = {253, 255, 0, 0, 1, 254, 255, 2, 1}
∆M6 = M6−˙M0 = {0, 253, 255, 0, 0, 1, 254, 255, 2}
∆M7 = M7−˙M0 = {5, 0, 253, 255, 0, 0, 1, 254, 255}
∆M8 = M8−˙M0 = {1, 3, 255, 255, 0, 0, 0, 1, 254}
∆M9 = M9−˙M0 = {254, 255, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1}
.
4) As to the eavesdropped ciphertext C = {29, 67, 144,
143, 74,127, 101, 24, 139}, assume its plaintext as M
whose differential between M0 is further denoted as ∆M,
Eve can get ∆M through
∆M =
∑˙9
i=1
[c(i)×˙∆Mi]
= {171, 255, 61, 116, 63, 191, 203, 242, 62}
.
5) Finally, Eve recover the plaintext M according to
M = ∆M+˙M0
= {171, 255, 61, 116, 63, 191, 203, 242, 62}
+˙{85, 16, 228, 187, 2, 230, 109, 110, 193}
= {0, 15, 33, 47, 65, 165, 56, 96, 255}
.
As can be observed, the recovered plaintext is exactly the same
with Alice’s original input M.
Besides, a gray-scale Lena, 16-bit precision X-ray and CT
images are introduced into Lan’s [12], Zhou’s [13] and Hua’s
[14] ciphers, respectively. With PCCA, the plaintexts have
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Fig. 3. Experiment results of the PCCA: (a)-(d), (e)-(h), and (i)-(l)
demonstrate the plaintext, ciphertext, calculated differential between
plaintext and M0, the recovered image of Lan’s [12], Zhou’s [13]
and Hua’s [14] ciphers, respectively.
been successfully recovered, as demonstrated in Fig. 3 where
corresponding results of Lan’s, Zhou’s and Hua’s ciphers are
listed in the 1st to 3rd row, respectively. The results are
reproducible, interested readers are encouraged to refer to the
source codes for details and extensions.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the security of a family of
image encryption schemes. The substitution of the involved
ciphers is implemented by a modular addition function, and
the encryption elements in both permutation and substitution
procedures are generated by the employed nonlinear dynamics.
We found the linear relationship between the differential of
plaintexts with that of ciphertexts. We then proposed a univer-
sal chosen-ciphertext attack which can decrypt the ciphertext
without retrieving the secret key or equivalent encryption
elements. Taking certain representative ciphers as case study,
the proposed attack has been experimentally validated. It was
also illustrated that the routine improvements, including new
dynamic phenomena and permutation techniques, are not able
to remedy the reported security flaws. We hope the proposed
cryptanalysis will be beneficial for the theoretical design and
security evaluation of future image ciphers.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPERTY 4
For image ciphers with iterative architecture, the output in
(i− 1)th layer will be the input of the next encryption round,
as shown in Eq. (9). Therefore, we can get
∆C(i) = H(i)(basic)(∆M(i))
= H(i)(basic)(∆C(i−1))
= H(i)(basic)[H(i−1)(basic)(∆C(i−2))]
= . . .
= H(i)(basic){H(i−1)(basic)[. . .H(1)(basic)(∆C(0))]}
= H(i)(basic){H(i−1)(basic)[. . .H(1)(basic)(∆M(1))]}
. (23)
In other words,
H(1)−(N)(basic) (∆M(1)) = H(N)(basic){H(N−1)(basic)[. . .H(1)(basic)(∆M(1))]}.
As H(i)(basic)(∆M), i ∈ [1, N ] is bijective, modular additive and
multipliable, H(1)−(N)(basic) (∆M(1)) consequently has the proper-
ties of bijectivity, additivity and multiplicability.
Hence completes the proof.
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